Introduction
Recent initiatives by banking supervisors, central banks and other authorities have emphasized the importance of corporate governance practices in banking sectors (see, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010) . The policy makers constantly -and with considerable effort since the subprime crisis broke out -try to improve current legislation to enable better monitoring of bank activities, including their risk-taking. It is widely recognized that the recent financial crisis is to a large extent attributable to excessive risk-taking by banks and that shortcomings in bank corporate governance may have had a central role in the development of the crisis. An OECD report argues that, 'the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements ' (Kirkpatrick, 2009) . Moreover, the crisis revealed the potential, underestimated consequences of unregulated systemic risk-taking by banks. As suggested by de Andres and Vallelado (2008) , the main aim of regulators, which is to reduce systemic risk, might come into conflict with the main purpose of shareholders, which is to improve the share value by increasing their risk-taking. More recently, the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States concluded that, 'dramatic failures of corporate governance ... at many systematically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis ' (Beltratti and Stulz, 2011 played a key role in the performance of banks during the crisis (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010) .
The idea is generally that banks with poor governance engaged in excessive risk-taking, causing them to make larger losses during the crisis because they were riskier. In other words, to the extent that governance played a role, we would expect banks with better governance to have performed better. Among several corporate governance characteristics, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) in its consultative document, 'Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations', places the board of directors as an essential part of bank regulatory reforms. In addition, the second pillar (supervisory review process) of the 2004 Basel Accord identifies the role of the board of directors as being an integral part of risk management (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005:163-164). The board of directors is even more critical as a governance mechanism in credit institutions than in its non-bank counterparts, because the director's fiduciary responsibilities extend beyond shareholders, to depositors and regulators (Macey and O'Hara, 2003) . Moreover, the bank board plays a vital role in the sound governance of complex banks: in the presence of opaque bank lending activities, the role of the bank board is more important, as other stakeholders, such as shareholders or debt holders, are not able to impose effective governance in banks (Levine, 2004) . According to de Andres and Vallelado (2008) , the role of boards as a mechanism for corporate governance of banks takes on special relevance in a framework of limited competition, intense regulation, and higher informational asymmetries due to the complexity of the banking business. Thus, the board becomes a key mechanism for monitoring managers' behaviour and advising them on strategy identification and implementation. Bank directors' specific knowledge of the complex banking business enables them to monitor and advise managers efficiently. A bank's board plays a vital role in achieving effective governance. According to Caprio and Levine (2002) , this happens because neither dispersed shareholders/ debtholders nor the market for corporate control can impose effective governance in banks. In particular, Pathan (2009) defines a 'strong board' (i.e., a small board and more independent directors), as a board that is more effective in monitoring bank managers and reflects more of bank shareholders' interests.
In this chapter, we aim to provide empirical evidence for the effect of strong bank boards on proper measures of tail and systemic bank risk-taking during the financial crisis. Academics and regulators have developed different concepts and proposals regarding ways to assess
